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IN THE 
Supreme Court 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
LLOYD C. ANDERSEN, 
Plaintiff OJYI)d Appe:lZoot, 
vs. 
BINGHAM AND GARFIELD RAIL-
WAY COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF :OF RESPONDENT 
I. 
STA'TEMEN'T :OF FACTS 
Case No. 
7356 
To the end that the facts of this case as presented 
to the jury may be fully and fairly stated to the court, 
respondent sup,p1ements the statement contained in Ap-
pellant's Brief as follows: 
1. At the time of the accident it was dark, with the 
sky clear and the highway smooth, level and concrete 
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surfaced. (R. 130) The silhouette failure (p. 3) has no 
factual basis here. The darkness was described as 
''pitch''. (R. 258) Appellant's view of the crossing and 
approaching train was unobstructed. (Ex. 3 and 4) 
2. Appellant incorrectly cites the record (p: 3) as 
establishing that plaintiff's failure to observe the train 
as he approached the crossing was an illusion from an 
engine headlight. This statement is as factually specula-
tive as the equally possible theories that appellant was 
in a condition una:ble to observe or act prudently under 
the circumstances, was driving too fast, was not look-
ing, etc. 
3. Plaintiff specifically abandoned (R. 343.(a)) all 
of his negligence allegations with the exception of the 
alleged defective brakes; yet in his brief (p. 3) he re-
iterated that there were no lights or automatic safety 
devices at the crossing; that no flagman was there sta-
tioned; and that there were no lights on the lead car of 
the train. The crossing protection was in every respect 
standard, and the court without objection so instructed. 
(R. 86) 
4. Plaintiff incorrectly cites the record as estab-
lishing his speed at 31 to 40 miles per hour. (p. 3). 
The cited pages, plus ~pages 172 and 182 of the record, 
indicate plaintiff's speed varied from a minimum suffi-
cient to pass another car which itself was going 31 miles 
per hour (R. 172) up to 45 miles per hour. (R. 182) 
5. On page 4 of his brief plaintiff cites page 226 
of the record for the fact that "At the time Paddock 
gave the washout signal the leading end of the leading 
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car 'Yas about three car lengths fron1 the railroad cross-
ing". But Engineer Colby guessed this distance at one 
car length. (R. 279) Trainman Chipman said there was 
not time to stop the· train. (R·. 232) Colby said likewise 
(R. 293-4); and Trainman Hyland (R. 309) and Pad-
dock, 'vho was in charge of the train crew (R. 317, 320) 
said the washout was given 10 to 15 feet from the high-
way pavement-approximately 36 feet or one standard 
car length from the point of impact. 
6. On page 7 of appellant's brief the fact is stated 
that "the leakage in this train vvas unusual". Omitted 
is Engineer Colby's statement that the leakage-, nor-
mally present in railroad airbrake operations-was ''the 
type of leakage we have been contending with and work-
ing with on that particular job ever. since I have been 
running engines out there". (R. 291) 
7. On page 8 and the first full paragraph of page 
9 of his brief appear improperly in the statement of 
facts unfounded argument that will be met hereafter. 
But it should be noted that the medical prognosis was 
that plaintiff's recovery eventually would he, or in any 
event might be complete. (R. 198, 200-201, 203-5, 209·-
213, 216-2'17, 220-221); not that Andersen has actually 
suffered "permanent injury". 
8. Omitted material facts are the following: 
(a) When plain tiff's peril was ascertained, the 
train could not have been stopped in time to avoid 
the collision. This is uncontroverted, coming from 
Colby (R. 294), Paddock (R. 319), Hyland (R. 304) 
and Chipman (R. 232). While Colby on the basis of his 
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own estimates at first felt that there might have been a 
possibility for plaintiff to complete his end run around 
the train ( R. 294), this guess was later qualified when 
he stated that the distances given by the men at the 
front end of the train should he governing rather than 
his own guesses. (R. 280) 
(b) The defendant railroad took the following ac-
tion to warn plaintiff: standard reflectorized railroad 
cross buck and advance warnjng signs were within An-
dersen's vision, _one 21 feet west of the crossing and the 
other 417 feet to the west (R. 28 and Ex. 3 and 4); three 
trainmen were on the lead car equipped with and using 
standard lanterns to warn oncoming traffic. (R. 304) 
The engine bell was ringing and the usual crossing 
whistle signal was given by the engineer. (R. 273) A& 
shown by Exhibits 3 and 4 the view was unobstructed 
and there were no unusual crossing conditions. 
(c) The actual halt of the train was entirely nor-
mal according to most of the witnesses. (R. 320) Things 
happened "on split second schedule'' (R. 232); except 
for the physical distances on Exhibits 3 and 4, esti-
mates of other distances were only rough approxima-
tions. (R. 257) 
(d) Plaintiff applied his own motor vehicle brakes 
to the extent that tire marks 28 inches long were left on 
the pavement 72 feet west of the point of impact (R. 189) ; 
then he· apparently released the brakes and decided to 
end-run the train. (R. 317) 
(e) Defendant's engine was modern and in "ex-
cellent" condition (R. 271); all 15 of the cars were 
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equipped with standard airbrakes, 5 of the 6 loaded cars 
and 3 of the 9 empties 'vith the n1ore recent AB ty.pe 
of brake, and one loaded and 6 empties with the standard 
K-2 type. (Ex. 11 and R. 331) No defect in these brakes 
\Yas ever located (R. 332, 12·4); after the accident the 
train ":ras operated as before except for the damaged 
lead car. (R. 333) 
(f) These cars were likewise equipped with hand 
brakes 'vhich were never used as the train was under 
control and the engineer felt no need for hand brakes. 
(R. 277) 
II. 
1. The jury was fairly and properly instructed (if 
the case 'vas to go to the jury) and plaintiff's motion for 
a new trial was correctly denied. 
2. The Court erred in denying defendant's motion 
for a directed verdict. 
III. 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1. 
1. The jury was fairly and prop~erly instructed (if ~the 
case was to go to the jury) and plaintiff's motion for a 
new trial was cor~rectly deni1ed. 
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Defendant's first point is the reverse of plaintiff's 
sing-le point under which he has consolidated his four 
assignments of error. We submit that the jury was 
properly and fairly charged if indeed the case was to 
go to the jury. 
(a) At the outset we must meet a sub-argument 
of plaintiff-that the defendant had violated the Federal 
Safety Appliance Act. 
On page 11 of plaintiff's brief is quoted the perti-
nent language of the Act; the text of the absolute duty 
(not absolute liabilit.y as plaintiff argues on page 15) 
is that the engineer must be able to control the speed 
of the train ''without requiring brakemen to use the 
common handhrake for that purpose.'' It is therefore 
an absolute duty, but qwa~ifie:d by the above w·ords, that 
Congress has substituted for the common law duty of 
reasonable care. Thus qualified, we have no quarrel with 
plaintiff's statements and citations under this sub-point, 
:pages 11 to 17. Conceding, too, that as argued on page 
17, "the test. of compliance lies in the performance of 
the appliance" and assuming that if Colby's testimony 
is to be believed, the brakes on all 15 cars of the train 
did not go into emergency, how does this establish a 
violation of the Act~ 
Colby said that even though the leakage was great, 
he had control of his train and never felt the need for 
hand brakes. (R. 277) Obviously this was so, for no 
one has ever contended that any equipment was defec-
tive or failed to function on the engin·e; and the 5 of 6 
loaded cars and 3 of the 9 empties which had the AB 
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type of brake would function insofar as emergency was 
concerned, regardless of leakage or prior brake service 
applications. (R .. 260, 336-340.) 
The only possible failure short of ideal operation 
"'"ould be in the 5 empty sand gondola cars, the one empty 
flat car, and the loaded tank car next to the engine which 
had the less-efficient-as-to-en1ergency, but still st~andard., 
K-2 typ~e of brake. (Ex. 11, R. 258-260, 335.) 
As Colby said, there are thousands of these K-2 
type brakes in operation as standard equipment on the 
various railroad trunk lines (R. 258); yet up·on analysis 
his oomplaint and that of plaintiff is that this standard 
equipment-lacking the emergency reservoir feature of 
the more modern AB typ~operated just ias it was d:e-
S.igned to do. According to Colby some probably didn't 
go into emergency when Colby "big-holed" on top of 
the many service, lap, and leakage applications of brak-
ing power. (R. 252') : 
Q. Now, what hap~pened when you big-holed the 
brakes~ 
A. Well, the train began slowing down. 
Q. Did you get an emergency application~ 
A. Not throughout the train, no. 
Q. You didn't go into ·emergency throughout the 
train? 
A. The train didn't. 
Even so, the statutory test of the Federal Safety 
Appliance Act-''that the engine·er on the locomotive 
drawing such train can control its speed without requir-
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ing brakemen to use the common hand brake for that 
purp~se," was met. (R. 276) : 
Q. The brakes apparently operated properly, on 
each of those applications you obtained the 
necessary braking power, right~ 
A. Yes, I got too much when I held it on lap, 
then I got too much braking power and had 
to release it. 
Q. You didn't notice anything that led you to 
feel you should stop that train because you 
were not having proper braking, did you~ 
A. Not in that short distance. 
Q. Not in that short distance. 
Q. So you kept proceeding; is that right? 
·A. Y·es, sir, I .kept proceeding. 
Q. And your brakes controlled that train so that 
your speed gradually decreased; is that cor-
rect~ 
A. Well, it would decrease, then I would gain. 
Q. Then you would speed up a little~ 
A. Then I would speed up a little. 
Q. Then brake again~ 
A. Then start to pick up. 
Q. 'Then brake again? 
A. Then start to pick up. 
Q. At no time did you feel it necessary to signal 
for hand brakes, did you~ 
A. No, hecause-
Q. At any time-
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1\1R. BLACK: Let him answer the question. 
l\IR. BEHLE: He said "'No''. 
THE COURT: Well, he said "because" 
something: I think perha.ps he should be per .. -
mitted to explain his answer, if it is responsive 
to your question . 
.L~. At the lower end of this run, or grade, the 
grade is not as steep; therefore, I knew I 
could stop the train down there. 
Q. That's right; it says from 2 per cent down to 
1.85, and gradually flattens off, in the fore-
part of Exhibit 2, is that right~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. But, in spite of the fact that you knew the 
grade was getting less, did you feel any 
need for asking for hand brakes~ 
A. No. 
Defendant accordingly submits that there was no 
evidence of violation of the Federal~ Safety Appliance 
Act-the only one of the complaint's ten original alle-
gations of negligence ever a serious factor in this case. 
(b) Plaintiff's next sub-point-pages 17 to 2'4-is 
that the Last Clear Chance Doctrine was here fairly 
applicable. 
If the case was to go to the jury at all, defendant 
so concedes. This despite argument on fallacious pTem-
ises set forth on page 18 of appellant's brief which will 
be covered later, including attention to the very heart 
of plaintiff's case delineated on page 19-' ~a split second 
would have saved plaintiff harmless.'' 
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(c) Thus we come, plaintiff's brief .page 24, to the 
single point of plaintiff's appeal-that the jury was im-
properly instructed. 
We have no quarrel with the cited authorities (pp. 
25 to 31) as those cases and authorities are applied to 
their own facts. Interesting, however; is the omission 
from those authorities of the Dr~mmond and Van Wag-
oner cases, the two recent leading cases of this court 
involving railroad crossing ac~idents. 
Diametrically opposed to plaintiff's contention that 
instructing on both the law of contributory negligence 
and the Last Clear Chance Doctrine is error, we would 
have thought the contrary elementary in negligence 
cases. The jury in its deliberations in a last clear chance 
must, as we see it, as a rule make three determinations 
and be instructed · accordingly; ( 1) Was the defendant 
negligent at all~ If not, there is no liability; if so, the 
next question arises; (2) Was .plaintiff negligent~ If 
not, there is liability on the part of defendant; if so, 
there is presented the final . question; ( 3) Did defend-
ant have and fail to use the last clear chance~ If this 
is answered in the negative, plaintiff cannot prevail; if 
so, defendant is liable. 
Thus we conceive it a non sequitur to say that 
"where the doctrine of last clear chance is presented as 
an iss.ue for the jury it' is clearly erroneous for the 
court to instruct that if the negligence of plaintiff con-
tributed to cause his own injury he cannot recover.'' 
The instructions must cover hoth simple negligence and 
contributory negligence as essential preliminaries to the 
10 
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final application of the doctrine of the last clea.r chance. 
And so the trial court instructed in a charge of 
t"~enty-tw·o instructions (R. 74 to 95 ), including that of 
No. 21 wherein the jury was directed to consider the 
entire charge as a connected whole without undue refer-
ence to any one particular point. (R .. 194) True, in 
Instruction No. 11 covering contributory negligence and 
plaintiff's duties as a driver, no specific mention is made 
of the Last Clear Chance Doctrine, which is covered by 
the very next instruction. But this court has often stated 
the impracticability of covering and reiterating all points 
and possibilities in each sep·arate instruction. 
Van Cleave v. Lynch, 
106 Utah 159, 166 P. 2d 244. 
Earle v. Salt Lake & Utah R. Corp·., 
109 Utah 111, 165 P. 2d 877. 
Gogo v. Continental Casualty Co., 
109 Utah 122, 165 P. 2d 882. 
Graham v. Johnson, 
______ Utah ----.--, 166 P. 2d 230. 
Martin v. Sheffield, 
______ Utah ______ , 189 P. 2d 127. 
And so we submit that the charge was p-roper and 
fairly presented the case to the jury, which without too 
much difficulty (R. 39) found the issues in favor of 
defendant and the evidence to establish either want of 
negligence on the part of defendant, that plaintiff's own 
delict was a proximate cause of his injuries, or probably 
both. 
11 
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Point 2. 
2. The Court erred in denying de{iendant's motion for 
a directed verdict. 
Defendant, to sustain in any event the judgment 
belovv, submits that under the evidence in this case the 
court should have directed a verdict against plaintiff; 
the case should not have been submitted to the jury at 
all for decision on the merits. Under the evidence most 
favorable to plaintiff, and as a matter of law, his own 
actions and failures to act were a .proximate cause of 
the accident; defendant was neither itself negligent; nor 
did it have the last clear chance to avoid the collision. 
(a) Defendant's lack of negligence has heen ar-
gued under Point 1(a) and need not be reiterated here. 
(b) Plaintiff's own negligence, though speculative in 
detail, neViertheless existed and p:ersisted until the ~end. 
Having the duty as he approached the crossing to 
use ordinary care for his own safety, to use his senses 
of sight and hearing, to keep a lookout ahead, to keep 
his car under safe control, and to drive at a speed which 
was reasonable and prudent under the existing condi-
tions of darkness (including any illusive mountain 
shadows), Lloyd Andersen nevertheless heeded not the 
reflectorized warning signs 417 feet and 21 feet in ad-
vance of the crossing, heeded not the trainmen's warn-
ing lights and sounding bells and whistles. He plunged 
right on at a speed over 31 and prohably at least 45 
miles per hour in an attempt to ''end-run'' the defend-
ant's train, despite its right of way. 
12 
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This delict on plaintiff's part continued right up 
to the point of impact, 'vhatever its motivation-ex-
cessive speed, improper lookout, or reckless driving when 
72 feet a"Tay .. A .. ndersen finally determined to beat the 
train. His conduct 'Yas black in contrast to the white 
of Davies'· donkey tied in the road, Teakle thrown be-
t"Teen the rails, Bunker fallen from the pilot, and the 
dumb child in the Thompson case. 
Utah's most recent case on this point is Drun1mond 
v. Union Pacific R. Co., 177 P.(2d) 903, ________ Utah ________ , 
decided February 20, 1947. In view of this recent unani-
mous decision by the present Utah Supreme Court and 
its review of Utah law where railroad crossing acci-
dents are concerned, we largely confine our authorities 
on this point to that case .. 
There, as here, plaintiff driver was familiar with 
the road; the crossing angle was approximately the 
same, although there the train approached- from the 
driver's rear. The view was unobstructed in both cases, 
although for a much further distance in this case; there 
were no unusual crossing conditions such as protruding 
rails, multiplicity of tracks, etc., in either case. But here 
the facts are much stronger for the defendant: the 
train was moving at a much slower rate of speed; plain-
tiff was driving much faster ; and there was no evidence 
as in the Drummond case that there were inadequate 
crossing signals or warnings. 
A fortiori it seems plain that in this case, too, the 
trial court should have said as in the Drummond case: 
13 
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'' So, here, the facts peculiar to this case 
lead to the inescapable conclusion that plaintiff's 
own acts and conduct were not in keeping with 
the care required of a traveler upon the high-
way about to go upon and across the tracks of a 
railroad. Had this plaintiff exercised such care, 
then the collision would have been avoided.'' 
For further Utah cases, where on facts more favor-
able to plaintiff than in this case recovery was denied 
plain tiff drivers o;s a matt~er of ZaJW, se·e : 
Nabrotzky v. Salt Lake & Utah Railroad, 
103 Utah 274, 135 P.(2d) 115; 
Nuttall v. Denver & Rio Grande Railroad, 
98 Utah 383, 99 P.(2d) 15; 
Pollett v. Denver & Rio Grande, 
82 Utah 505, 2·5 P.(2d) 963; 
Clark v. Union Pacific R. Co., 
70 Utah 29, 257 P. 1050; 
Shortino v. Salt Lake & Utah Railroad Co., 
52 Utah 276, 174 P. 860. 
Applying the same rule, the United States Supreme 
Court said in Fairport, P. & E. Co. v. Meredith, 292 U. 8. 
589, 78 L. ed. 1446, 1448, imlvolving this s1ame Federal 
81(]4 ety A ~p1lvarnoe Act : 
There is also evidence which fairly estab- _ 
lishes that as respondent drew near the crossing 
the train was in plain view for a sufficient length 
of time to have enabled respondent, by the use of 
ordinary care, to see the train, stop and avoid 
the collision, and, therefore, that she was guilty 
of contributory negligence. Miller v. Union Pa-
cific Railroad Co., 290 U. S. 227, 231, 54 S. Ct. 
172, 78 L. ed. 285. 
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The facts are as different as could be imagined 
fro1n Pippy v. Oregon Short Lin~ R. Co., 79 Utah 425, 
11 P.(2d) 305, \vhere, among other things, the defend-
ant's train was proceeding at sixty miles per hour over 
an obstructed crossing consisting of many tracks and a 
badly rutted road, vvith plaintiff driving at fro1n five to 
six miles per hour and testifying~ that the automatic sig-
nals did not \York a.nd that no whistle or bell was sounded. 
This is the only Utah case permitting recovery, and 
then by a three-two decision reversing the court below 
because of the extreme facts against the railroad. 
As Mr. Justice Holmes said for the unanimous court 
in Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U. S. 66, 
72 L. ed. 167 : 
''If at the last moment Goodman (the driver) 
found hlmself in an emergency it was his own 
fault that he did not reduce his speed earlier 
and come to a stop.'' 
(c) Here defendant had neither the last chanc~e nor 
a clear chance to avoid the accident. 
Certainly if Paddock and Hyland were to be be-
lieved, 10 to 15 feet was no time within which, ascer-
taining plaintiff's peril, defendant could act to avoid 
the collision. Hyland, when he first saw the car, guessed 
that he could have stopped the train (R. 310) but was 
under no duty to do so in view of the train's right of 
way. And when he realized the plaintiff's danger-since 
for some reason Andersen had determined to end-run 
the train-it was too late to even kick the angle-cock. 
(R. 309) 
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Paddock, too, saw the automobile seem to reduce 
speed as if to stop; then when Andersen swerved to the 
other lane and kept proceeding it was too late for the 
train to stop, although he gave Engineer Colby the 
washout or emergency signal. (R. 317) His final state-
ment to Mr. Black was that it never occurred that there 
might be a collision until the leading part .of the train 
was 1'5 feet from the pavement. (R. 329) Then under 
all guesses and opinions it was too late to stop, since 
four to six car lengths was the most favorable guess to 
plaintiff as to the minimum stopping distance; and 
under Paddock's version the actual stop was normal. 
(R. 320) 
Nor did Colby testify to the contrary. He big-holed 
momentarily before Paddock's washout; the day after 
the accident he estimated the lead car to be but one car 
length from the crossing. (R. 279) At the trial he left 
that distance to Paddock, Hyland and Chipman on the 
train's front end. (R. 280) Even with every brake in 
emergency he could not have stopped the train before 
the point of impact. (R. 293) 
A. No, I couldn't have stopped short of the 
crossing, if they had all went in emergency. 
Q·. What you told me, if the brakes stopped, 
as you hoped they would, the plaintiff might 
have had a better chance to get around the 
front of the train, because you would have 
slowed down a little more; is that it~ 
A. Well, that is due to the fact that the emer-
gency is much quicker than a service ; you 
get your full brake power much quicker. 
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Q. Well, if you had all the emergency that you 
eould have desired, isn't it a fact the train 
wouldn ~t have stopp·ed by the crossing, but 
it might have slowed down sufficiently so 
the plaintiff might have completed running 
around the front end of the train; isn't that 
right~ 
.A.. There is a possibility, yes; I believe I made 
that statement before. 
Q. And you didn't have a clear opportunity or 
wouldn't have had a clear opportunity to 
have stopped that train without it going 
into the crossing; is that right~ 
A. No, not under those procedures. 
Q. And that is necessarily so because you are 
not sure exactly how far the front end was 
from the crossing; isn't that right~ 
A. No, I wasn't sure until they got around the 
curve far enough that I could see the switch-
man's light and see the lights of the head 
car shining down the highway. 
Q. You would rather leave the exact distance 
as to how far that said train was from the 
crossing to the men who were there~ 
A. Yes, as to when I received the washout sig-
nal, you c.ould determine then as to how far 
I was from it when I used emergency, he-
cause it was momentarily after I went to 
the emergency position when I got the wash-
out. 
Chipman guessed most favorably for plaintiff, and 
his testimony therefore must be used in testing the cor-
rectness of the court's ruling. In contrast to Paddock 
and Hyland, he thought the washout signal and big-hole 
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emergency brake application were given when the end 
of the lead car was about three car lengths away. (R. 
226) But he, too, Staid the dista;nce wa,s itnsufficient t.o 
stop short .of the coll.ision (R. 226) : 
Q. About how far was the lead end of the car, 
the leading car, from the intersection from 
the highway itself, at the time when you 
saw that washout signal given~ 
A. Well, around about three cars; we was right 
there by those poles, I am pretty sure, in 
there. 
Q. You say three car lengths to the south and · 
east, or to the south of the crossing~ 
A. Yes, up towards the mountain. 
Q. Now, was the train able to stop short of 
the collision~ 
A. No. 
It was Colby-who had abrogated his own guesses 
as to distance to Paddock, Chipman and Hyland (R,. 
293-294) - who interjected the testimony supporting 
plaintiff's theory in this case: "Plaintiff may have had 
a better chance to get around the front of the train'' if 
every brake had gone into emergency, as they were not 
designed to do. (R. 293) 
But Paddock, Chipman and Hyland unanimously 
scotched that hope. While plaintiff argues on page 
19 of his brief "a split second would have saved the 
plaintiff harmless'', the three men who were the·re in 
effect said "The time was too short, even by a hair". 
As in the case of contributory negligence on the 
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part of plaintiff drivers, the present Utah Supreme Court 
by unanimous decision has but recently declared the 
Utah lR\V on the last clear chance doctrine and specifically 
where railroad crossing accidents are involved. 
In the case of \:--an VVagoner v. Union P·acific R. Co., 
-------- Utah --------, 186 P. ( 2d) 293, decided November 3, 
1947, the court quoted extensively from the R~statement 
of the Law of Torts and from Graham v. Johnson, 166 
P.(2d) 230, 235, 109 Utah 365, dealing with the Last 
Clear Chance Doctrine as app1ied to automobile inter-
section cases. It concluded: 
''The opportunity to avoid the accident must 
not be a possibility; it must he a clear opportun-
ity. Not even by speculation could the jury reach 
a ve-rdict on the- theory that the train crew had 
time to appreciate that deceased was negligent 
and that by reasonable means they could have 
avoided the resulting collision. Wh·en, as in this 
jurisdiction, a train has the p·referred right of 
way, its operator is entitled to assume the driver 
of a car will yield to this preferment, and if the 
doctrine of last clear chance is to be invoked, it 
must clearly appear that time permitted the 
train crew to appreciate the deceased's predica-
ment, and to give warnings sufficiently early 
enough for the deceased to extricate himself, or 
the time element was sufficient to permit the 
crw to bring the train to a stop·. No such show-
ing was made here. ' ' 
In spite of allegations in the complaint that defend-
ant's train crew failed to observe and give proper warn-
ings, the undisputed evidence in this case shows in con-
trast that here defendant's train crew was keenly alert 
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and mindful of the hazard of the crossing. Every step 
possible was taken to warn the oncoming motor vehicle 
by way of whistle, bell, swinging signal lanterns, keeping 
the train under control at slow speed, all in addition 
to the standard crossing warning signals maintained 
by both the defendant and the State Road Commission. 
With this testimony defendant submits that under 
Utah law the doctrine of the last clear chance should not 
have been applied to excuse plaintiff from his own negli-
gence. The defendant had neither the last chance nor a 
clear chance; and the remarks of Mr. Justice Wolfe in 
his concurring opinion in the Van Wagoner case are 
particularly apt: 
''A driver who drives in front of an on-
coming engine or train with insufficient time to 
cross is hardly in position to say: 'If you had 
made it smoother, I might or could have gotten 
clear by a hair '. '? 
The situation appears squarely governed by the 
Van Wagoner case and the Graham case : 
''Where the situation is, to reasonable minds, 
so doubtful as to whether the second party had 
time to avoid it, the matter should not be given 
to the jury; otherwise, we are, as said in the case 
of Thomas v. Sadleir, 108 Utah 552, 162 P. (2d) 
112, 115, in grave danger of permitting the one 
really at 'fault to shift the hlame for the accident 
on the other by accentuation of the other's duty to 
avoid the effect of the first one's negligence'." 
'S:ee :also application of .the same rule to the facts in 
the cases of St. Louis & San Francisco R. Co. v. Sum-
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mers, (C.C.A. 8) 1909, 173 F. 358; Illinois Central R. Co. 
v. Nelson, (C.C.A. 8) 1909, 173 F. 915; Denver City 
Tram,Yay Y. Cobb, (C.C.A. 8) 1908, 164 F. 41; and At-
chison, Topeka & ·Santa Fe Ry. v. Taylor, ( C.C.A. 8) 
1912, 196 F. 878. 
This court has said in the \~"an Wagoner case : 
~'When one party thrusts upon another the 
onus of avoiding an accident which was due en-
tirely to the fact that the first party is in the 
fairly rapid p-rocess of placing himself in the 
path of a car driven by the second party, the 
court, before it permits the jury to determine 
whether the second ·party could have avoided the 
accident, must he reasonably sure that there was 
time enough for the jury to so find. * * * '' 
The opinion then quotes the following from Section 
480, Chapter 17, Volume II, Restatement of Torts: 
''A plaintiff who, hy the exercise of reason-
able vigilance could have observed the danger 
created· by the defendant's negligence in time 
to have avoided harm therefrom, may recover if, 
but only if, the defendant (a) knew of the plain-
tiff's. situation, and (h) realized or had reason 
to realize that the plaintiff was inattentive and 
therefore unlikely to discover his peril in time 
to avoid the harm, and (c) thereafter is negli-
gent in failing to utilize with reasonable care and 
competence his then existing ability to avoid 
harming the plaintiff." (Italics ours.) 
The Meredith case, supra, clearly says that the 
Federal Safety Ap·pliance Act does not create such ab--
solute liability as to preclude application of this prin-
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ciple of Utah law, and the decision of the Tenth Circuit 
further. emphasized this same point in this case. (109 
Fed 2d 328) 
IV. 
Counsel for plaintiff in this case were of counsel in 
the Drummond case; consequently here reliance was 
placed on the essential combination of the Federal Saf·ety 
Appliance Act and the Last Clear Chance Doctrine to 
avoid the consequences of the Drummond case. 
But when the undisputed and admitted facts were 
boiled down in the record before this court, we find: 
1. Plaintiff failed to listen, look or stop, and under 
the doctrine of the Drunnnond case, continued negli-
gently driving his automobile into the crossing. 
2. Likewise defendant's negligence-if under the 
Federal Act indeed negligence it was-continued parallel 
with that of plaintiff until the tim·e of impact. 
3. There was ia bare p~ossibility only that with brak-
ing equipment of 'll!'nquestioned condition, the accident 
might have been avoided. The court could not therefore 
''be reasonably sure that there was ~time enough for the 
jury" to hold that the railroad could have avoided the 
accident. 
We have already adverted to the fact that the plain-
tiff has no explanation for his own course of conduct. 
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To paraphrase Mr. J~stice Wolfe, plaintiff here says: 
"If you had only stopped a little bit sooner, I might or 
could have gotten clear by a hair." But this Court has 
said that to grant relief on this basis would be to permit 
''the one really at 'fault to shift the blame for the acci-
dent'." This the Utah law prohibits; and Congress has 
not abrogated Utah's rule. 
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of 
the court below should be sus~tained. The jury was fairly 
and properly instructed and deternrined the issues con-
trary to plaintiff. This, though the same result should 
have been reached by granting defendant's motion for 
directed verdict. 
Respectfully submitted, 
C. C. P ARS·ONS, 
WM. M. McCREA, 
A. D. MOFFAT, 
CALVIN A. BEHLE, 
Attorneys for RespofYI)de'(YI)~ 
Bingham amd Garfield Rail-
way C omparrvy. 
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